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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies three topics on bequests and bequest motives. It firstly 
documents the patterns and time trends of bequest distributions. Then this dissertation 
estimates the impacts of bequests and estate taxation on the income distribution of 
children. Thirdly this dissertation provides new evidence on a positive relationship 
between children and bequest motives and reconciles the new findings with different the 
mixed evidence in literature. 
On the distributions of bequests over time, this dissertation finds that bequests in 
aggregate are between 300 and 700 billions of 2012 dollars. Housing and financial assets 
dominant other bequeathable assets and account for over 60 percent of all bequests. 
Moreover, bequests are highly concentrated on the rich few that the top 10 percent 
decedents contribute over 60 percent of all bequests during 16 years. Finally, surviving 
spouses inherit almost all bequests of decedents and children inherit about 77 percent of 
all bequests if the decedents are single. 
Despite the significant aggregate scale of bequests and the nontrivial average 
annual income generated by inheritances, the impacts of receiving bequests and 
imposing estate taxes are trivial—no more than 3 percent—on the income inequality of 
children. The reason is that the annual income from inheritance is too small that account 
for only about 3 percent of the total income of children and their households on average. 
Last but not least, this dissertation finds that the opposite effects of the parents’ 
belief of future help from children and the excessive financial burdens of some parents 
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on bequest motives and actual bequests lead to negative findings on the relationship 
between having a child and having a bequest motive in literature. Finally this 
dissertation reconciles the new evidence with the mixed evidence of bequest motives in 
literature. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation studies tree topics of bequests that the first one concerns the 
distribution of bequests left by the middle-aged and elderly Americans. The second topic 
is about the impacts of bequests on the income distribution of children. The third topic 
involves a puzzle in the bequest motives literature that refers to the relationship between 
having a child and having a bequest motive.  
1.1 Patterns of time trends of bequest distributions between 1996 and 2012 
Leaving bequests--whether planned in advance or not--was common for the 
majority of the middle-aged and elderly Americans between 1996 and 2012. By focusing 
on individuals above age 50 and their households in Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), this paper firstly documents the patterns and time trends of bequests. Then we 
study the effects of bequest distribution on the income distribution of the children and 
their households of the middle-aged and elderly individuals. 
In aggregate, the annual size of bequests fluctuates between 300 and 800 billion 
2012 dollars1. The fluctuation of the overall scale of bequests and some economic 
indices, especially the housing price index, are significantly correlated. Moreover, the 
fraction of individuals that leave a positive amount of bequests dropped by 10 percent—
from about 80 to 70 percent—during the 16 years. However, the fraction of individuals 
that finally leave a nontrivial amount of bequests increased from about 20 percent in 
                                                 
1 All dollars mentioned in this dissertation are 2012 US dollars. 
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1996 to about 27 percent in 2006. As a result, the concentration of bequeathable wealth 
in the hands of the rich also increased over time. Last but not least, the surviving spouses 
inherit almost all bequests of their deceased partners. On the other hand, about three-
quarters of all bequests left by single decedents are inherited by children.   
1.2 Impacts of bequests and estate taxation on income distribution of children 
To study the impacts of bequests on the income distribution of offspring, we 
firstly compute the annual income yielded by the inheritance using the actual rates of 
returns of different types of assets. Then we compare the income distributions before and 
after receiving inheritances, and the income distributions with inheritances before and 
after imposing the estate tax. 
We find that although the annual income generated by inheritances are not trivial, 
and imposing an estate tax may reduce a 20 percent reduction of the aggregate 
inheritance income flow, the effects of inheritance income and estate tax on the income 
distribution of children is negligible. The reason is that the annual returns of inheritances 
compared with the household income of children are too small—about 2 percent on 
average and 7 percent at the median. As a results, receiving inheritances increases the 
income inequality—measured by Gini coefficient—of children households by no more 
than 3 percent. On the other hand, estate taxation reduces the income inequality by about 
2 percent. Last but not least, we test three alternative explanations that may also lead to 
the limited effects of inheritance income flow and estate taxation. The results of the tests 
do not support the alternative hypotheses.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two of this chapter briefly 
summarizes the literature of bequest distribution and intergenerational inequality. 
Section three explains the reasons that we use the HRS data sets and the features of the 
data. The patterns and time trends of bequests are in section four, and the impacts of 
bequest distribution on the household income of children will be discussed in section 
five and six. 
1.3 Children and bequest motives 
Although it is natural to assume that having a child is a primary motive that leads 
to saving for bequests, the studies of bequest motives find mixed—and mostly 
negative—evidence on a positive relationship between having a child and having a 
bequest motive. For this reason, we re-examine the relationship between having a child 
and having a bequest motive by focusing on two factors—parent-child interactions and 
excessive financial burden. 
We find that it is the parents’ belief of future help from children rather than the 
history that the children ever helped lead to stronger bequest motives and more actual 
bequests. To be specific, single parents who believe that their children will help them 
with their daily lives or financial needs in the future tend to leave more bequests and to 
transfer more to their children when they are alive. On the other hand, single parents 
who have received help from their children usually hold less bequeathable wealth, 
dissave faster, and finally leave less bequests than the single decedents who never 
received help from children, including the ones without any child. 
 4 
 
Moreover, we find that the single parents who usually receive help from their 
children have also spend larger fractions of their income for out-of-pocket medical 
purposes, compared with the parents that never get help from children and the decedents 
without any child. As a result, the excessive financial burden has negative impact on 
bequest motives and actual bequests. On average, the negative impact offsets—even 
overweighs—the positive effect on bequests due to the belief of future help from 
children.  
Last but not least, this paper reconciles the new findings with the bequests 
motives—including accidental bequests due to a lack of bequest motives—studied in 
literature. This paper argues that because previous studies in literature do not separate 
the two opposite effects of belief in children and excessive financial burden on bequests, 
they find little evidence between having a child and having a bequest motive and draw 
conclusions that bequests are mostly accidental or due to an egoistic—or a warm-glow—
motive. Although we find evidence of bequests motives for a subgroup of single parents 
with children, the exact type of the motives is still unclear. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section two reviews the 
literature of bequest distributions, the effects of bequests and estate taxation on inter-
generational inequality, and bequest motives. Section three documents the distributions 
of bequests and section four studies the effects of bequests and estate taxation on the 
distribution of household income of children. Section five estimates the effects of parent-
child interactions and excessive financial burdens on bequest motives and actual 
bequests. Finally, we summarize the primary findings of this dissertation. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The earliest comprehensive study on the distributions of bequests is Laitner 
(1979) that the author studies the effects of inheritances on the national distribution of 
wealth and proves that there is a stationary distribution of wealth. Then Laitner (2002) 
estimates the impacts of bequests and inter-vivos gifts on the aggregate capital stock, 
private net worth, and public policy options through a simulation approach.  
Although Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2012) do not directly study the distribution 
of bequests, they document the wealth trajectories using the HRS data sets and finds that 
the trajectories of most of the elderly are quite stable. For this reason, there findings shed 
light on the formation bequests. 
On the effects of bequests on the wellbeing of offspring, Gale and Scholz (1994) 
finds that intended transfers account for at least 20 percent of US wealth. Moreover, De 
Nardi (2004) calibrates a structural life cycle model and finds that bequests increase 
intergenerational wealth concentrations.  
On the impacts of estate taxation on intergenerational wealth and income 
inequality, De Nardi and Yang (2016) calibrate a structural model allowing estate 
taxation and find that increasing taxation increase the wellbeing of a newborn 
significantly, with a large welfare cost for the super-rich.   
Although it is natural to assume that we can identify a bequest motive by 
comparing the wealth or consumption trajectories between households with and without 
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children, literature finds mixed evidence of a positive relationship between having 
children and having a bequest motive.  
Hurd (1989) uses the number of kids as a sharp identification of having a bequest 
motive or not, and he finds that bequest motives are—even they exist—negligible and 
most bequests are accidental due to the increasing uncertainty of the time of death while 
aging. Using a similar approach, Gan, Gong, and McFadden (2015) also finds that the 
number of children does not identify bequest motives and therefore most bequests 
should be accidental. Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) to identifies a bequest motive with a 
fuzzy identification indicator function incorporated in a regime switching model. 
Although they control the number of kids, and the living distance between parents and 
children, as well as whether children are included in a life insurance policy, they also 
find no evidence that children are a major motive for bequests. Instead, they indicate that 
most bequest motives are egoistic.  
On evidence that supports the positive relationship between having a child and 
having a bequest motive, Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) find positive 
evidence of a strategic bequest motive that some parents exchange bequests for long 
term care from children. Moreover, Bernheim and Severinov (2003) argues that the 
equal division of bequests implies an altruistic bequest motives. 
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3. DATA AND IMPUTATION OF ACTUAL BEQUESTS 
 
This dissertation adopts uniform data for all three papers by merging different 
data sets of Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biannual longitudinal study started 
from 1992 that focuses on individuals above age 50 and their households. To be specific, 
the data sets are RAND HRS Data Documentation (Version O), RAND HRS Family 
Documentation (Version C), RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations (Version O), 
and the original HRS exit and post-exit interviews of each survey wave.   
RAND HRS Data Documentation contains various categories of wealth holdings 
and income, health conditions, family backgrounds, and demographics. RAND HRS 
Family Documentation and RAND HRS Income and Wealth Imputations supplement the 
core data set by providing details of family members and within family interactions, 
income and wealth, and life insurance. Data of estates and the end of life wealth 
allocations are from the original HRS exit and post-exit data sets. 
3.1 Summary of demographics of the decedents of interest 
Because focus on studying the distributions of bequests, the people of interest are 
the middle-age and elderly decedents. Every two years, between 5 and 8 percent of the 
respondents die within two years after the HRS survey of last period. Table 1 
summarizes some selected demographics—family structure, education, race, religious 
belief, sex, and age—of the decedents that are last observed every two years before 
death.  
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Table 1 Means of demographics of decedents at age 50 and above 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Family structure         
Couple with kids 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.45 
Couple no kids 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Single with kids 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.44 
Single no kids 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.08 
         
Education         
lower than high school 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.38 
High school graduate 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 
Some college 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.20 
College and above 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 
         
Race         
White 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.72 
Black 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.19 
Hispanic 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Other 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
         
Religion         
Protestant 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.68 
Catholic 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.23 
Jewish 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
None 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Other 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
         
Female 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.52 
Age 79.15 78.96 78.99 80.69 79.66 80.50 81.01 79.92 
         
Observations 1163 1277 1334 1144 1239 1189 1363 1005 
Note: All variables expect age are dummies that a mean reflects the share of a specific group of decedents 
with respect to all decedents. 
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Individuals with a surviving spouse, partner, or at least one kid are more likely to 
survive than the singles and the ones without any child. Among the decedents, the share 
of couples varies between 40 to 50 percent, compared with over 60 percent of all 
respondents. The fraction of individuals without children among the decedents is 
between 10 to 15 percent while the fraction is only 8 to 9 percent of all respondents. 
More educated individuals tend to outlive the less educated. The share of 
decedents with a college degree or above is between 8 to 14 percent, about 25 to 40 
percent lower than the share of the most educated middle-aged and elderly population. 
The percentages of decedents with some college education or high school degrees are 
also a bit lower than the percentages of the population. However, the fraction of the least 
educated decedents—the ones who have only accepted lower than high school 
education—is about 40 to 52 percent greater than the fraction of the least educated 
population. In the subsequent sections, we will discuss the divergence of the mortality 
risk of different groups usually lead to higher bequest concentration. 
3.2 Imputations of actual bequests 
Due to the nontrivial nonresponse rates, this dissertation imputes the missing 
values of estates, life insurance, and trusts by the same approach used by RAND for 
income and wealth imputations. The imputation procedure begins with imputing the 
missing ownership by logistic models. Then we impute the missing brackets using the 
ordered logit models. Finally, we use the nearest neighbor method to replace a missing 
amount by the actual amount that is in the same bracket of the missing amount and has 
the closest prediction of a linear regression model for log amounts, conditional on 
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demographics, subjective probability of leaving bequests, physical and mental health 
conditions, and cognitive scores.  
Figure 1 displays the distributions of log actual bequests before and after 
imputation. The overall distributions are similar except that the average amount of 
bequests after imputation is about 11 percent higher than the non-imputed average 
amount. This is due to a common fact of the survey data of household finance that 
wealthier individuals and household are more likely to refuse to report their financial 
status. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Distributions of log positive actual bequests before and after imputation 
Note: We pool the 2012 dollar actual bequests of different waves since the distributions of bequests before 
and after imputation do not vary significantly over time. 
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4. BEQUEST DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN 1996 AND 2012: PATTERNS 
AND TIME TRENDS 
 
To document the patterns and trends of bequests, this paper investigates the scale 
of bequests, the trend of leaving a bequest, seven principal inheritable assets, the degree 
of bequest concentration, and the division of bequests among recipients. To begin with, 
Table 2 summarizes the annual distributions of bequests and lists some important factors 
that reflect the scale, prevalence, concentration, and inclination of bequests.  
 
 
 
Table 2 Biannual distributions of actual bequests (2012 $1,000) 
 96-98 98-00 00-02 02-04 04-06 06-08 08-10 10-12 
Mean 211.54 228.08 171.92 223.78 251.66 316.38 234.35 203.98 
Std. Dev. 725.99 879.64 380.03 575.57 887.54 1260.39 1072.60 627.67 
99% 1507.21 2756.23 2006.61 2430.85 3416.58 4429.28 2000.54 2000.00 
95% 776.76 826.87 777.85 998.23 911.09 1109.54 882.90 918.63 
90% 446.31 429.61 499.99 607.71 617.44 683.32 604.65 520.55 
75% 181.67 180.00 181.33 218.36 231.99 221.46 210.58 200.00 
50% 56.34 35.21 32.41 49.91 28.47 21.74 24.61 16.59 
Fraction 
of positive 
bequests 
82.60% 72.98% 71.17% 74.21% 67.99% 67.51% 67.45% 67.33% 
Note: The summary of statistics is based on bequests no larger than 100 million dollars.  
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The average amount of biannual bequests varies between 170 and 320 thousand 
of 2012 dollars. On average, bequests have an increasing trend with periodic significant 
reductions. The first increasing trend is before 2000, and then bequests drops by a 
quarter between 2000 and 2002. Then the average amount of bequests rises again until 
2008 and 2010 during which the average amount drops by about a quarter as well.  
Despite the substantial average amounts, the distributions of bequests are highly 
skewed that the bequeathable wealth holdings increase exponentially disregard of 
different years. A direct implication of the highly skewed bequest distributions is that 
bequests are highly concentrated in hands of the rich, especially the richest 10 percent 
individuals and their households.  
In addition, the fraction of decedents that leave bequests decreases steadily from 
83 percent between 1996 and 1998 to 67 percent between 2010 and 2012.  
4.1 Scale of bequests 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the aggregate amount of bequests between 1996 
and 2012. Except the year 2012 that the aggregate amount of bequests is undervalued 
due to the data availability issue, the scale of bequests varies between 300 and 800 
billion US dollars, equivalent to 2.4 to 4.7 percent of real GDP, or 0.9 to 1.6 percent of 
private wealth of all individuals above 50 and their households. The fluctuations of the 
bequest-to-GDP and bequest-to-wealth ratio imply that the time trend of the scale of 
bequests is less stable than the time trends of GDP and private wealth due to the high 
uncertainty of death of the elderly. Moreover, the evolution of the scale of bequests 
follows the time trend of the economy, especially in the economic downturns. For 
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example, the aggregate amount of bequests dropped rapidly between 1999 and 2001 
when the dot-com bubble collapsed, and between 2008 and 2009 after the subprime 
mortgage crisis burst out. Last but not least, the fraction of decedents that leave a 
positive amount of bequests decreased from 83 percent in 1996 to 61 percent in 2012. 
The decreasing trend is primarily due to the decline of bequests left between 10 and 250 
thousand dollars. On the contrary, the fractions of decedents leaving bequests above 250 
thousand dollars was stable with a slight increasing trend.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Scale of bequests (2012 billions) between 1996 and 2012 
Note: Although HRS data are biannual, we can calculate the annual aggregate bequests since HRS tracks 
the exact date of death. Bequests and household wealth larger than 100 million are excluded from the 
calculations. The total amount of bequests in 2012 is undervalued by about a half because HRS survey are 
usually taken in the middle of an even year, and the data of the study in 2012 is not available yet.  
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Because the scale of bequests tracks the economy, we investigate the relationship 
between the scale of bequests and some primary economic indices. Figure 3 shows the 
correlations between the aggregate amount of bequests and GDP, private income, 
housing price index, stock index, and the prices of T-bills and T-bonds. Bequests in 
aggregate are moderately correlated with real GDP and household wealth. The 
correlation between the aggregate amount of bequests and the price of housing is highest 
since housing asset is the most important asset for all households, despite the livings or 
the decedents. The correlation between the scale of bequests and the stock price index 
and the price of bonds are weaker—lower than 40 percent—since most of the middle-
aged and elderly individuals and their households do not invest a substantial amount of 
financial products until they are rich enough. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Correlations between the aggregate amount of bequests and primary economic indices 
Note: Housing price index is from St. Louis FED. Stock index is the S&P 500 index. All indices are 
converted to the 2012 dollar. 
 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
GDP Household
wealth
Housing
Price Index
Stock Index T.Bills T.Bonds
 15 
 
4.2 Seven inheritable assets 
HRS asks questions about the ownerships and amounts of specific assets that can 
be categorized as seven principal components—housing and real estate assets, non-
housing financial assets, family business, retirement plans (IRAs), transportations, trusts, 
and life insurance policies—of bequest.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Percentages of bequeathable assets against quantiles of total bequeathable wealth  
Note: Percentages are based on pooled bequeathable assets between 1996 and 2012. The percentages of 
each principal bequeathable assets are calculated by the aggregate amount of a principal asset divided by 
the aggregate total bequeathable wealth within each 10 percent interval of the total bequeathable wealth. 
The horizontal line shows the 10 percent intervals of total bequeathable wealth. Percentages of the bottom 
30 percent total bequeathable wealth are omitted due to zero bequests. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 displays the most important almost time invariant pattern of the 
bequeathable wealth portfolio that the portfolio varies significantly with total 
bequeathable wealth holdings. Housing and real estate assets are the primary 
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bequeathable assets for almost all classes of households except the top 10 percent. 
However, the share of housing and real estate assets is reduced by half from 60 to 30 
percent as the total bequeathable wealth holdings get larger. On the other hand, the 
fraction of non-housing financial wealth—as the second largest bequeathable asset 
category—increases from 20 to 30 percent.  
For the categories of the bequeathable wealth, the shares of trusts, family 
business, and retirement plans increase with total bequeathable wealth holdings, while 
the percentages of life insurance and transportations decrease. In particular, trusts and 
life insurance as two major assets designed for bequests have opposite trends. Trusts 
perform as typical luxury goods that the share doubles—from slightly lower than 10 
percent to around 20 percent—within the top quartile. Life insurance, on the other hand, 
performs as an inferior good that the importance decreases as the wealth holdings 
increase.  
4.3 Bequest concentration 
In general, bequests are highly concentrated in the hands of the top rich 
decedents that the wealthiest 10 percent decedents, for example, have garnered between 
60 and 70 percent of aggregate bequests. The next 40 percent decedents usually 
contribute the rest of aggregate bequests. Figure 5 shows the time trends of bequest 
concentration and the basic pattern described above does not change significantly over 
time. 
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Figure 5 Fraction of bequests by actual bequests quantiles 
 
 
 
Also, we investigate bequest concentration for different groups of decedents that 
the concentration is measured by the difference between the share of aggregate bequests 
and the fraction of all decedents. We find that bequests are significantly concentrated 
among decedents with wills probated or witnessed, and decedents with college or higher 
degrees. Bequests are slightly concentrated among white/Caucasian and male decedents. 
However, we find little concentration of bequests on different numbers of children, 
marital status, age cohorts, or religious beliefs. 
4.4 Divisions of bequests among recipients 
In the exit and post-exit interviews, HRS asks questions to the surviving spouse, 
children, or a financial respondent of a decedent about how bequests are divided among 
the recipients, namely the surviving spouse, children, charities, other relatives of the 
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decedent, and any other recipients. Table 3 lists the division of bequests among all 
recipients. About three-quarters of all bequests between 1996 and 2012 were inherited 
by the surviving spouses and 16 percent went to children and their households. The 
shares of other recipients were small.  
 
 
 
Table 3 Division of bequests among recipients 
 All households Single households 
Spouse 74.53% 0.00% 
Children 16.37% 66.99% 
Charities 2.58% 4.61% 
Other relatives 4.19% 13.53% 
Others 2.34% 14.87% 
Note: This table omits the division of bequests of decedents that are died with a surviving spouse since 
almost all bequests were inherited by the surviving spouses.  
 
 
 
When we condition on the marital status of the decedents, almost all bequests 
were inherited by the surviving spouses if the decedents were from couple households. 
On the other hand, the majority of bequests—about 67 percent—were inherited by 
children if the decedents died without a wife or a partner. Moreover, over three-quarters 
of all single decedents chose to distribute bequests equally among their children. 
4.5 Summary 
To document the patterns and time trends of bequests, we study the aggregate 
scale, prevalence, composition, concentration, and division of bequests. The aggregate 
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scale of bequests is substantial and tracks the development of the economy. Although the 
overall tendency of leaving bequests reduced about ten percent during the 16 years of 
study, the fraction of decedents that leaving moderate to tremendous amounts of 
bequests was stable with a slight increasing trend. Moreover, bequests are highly 
concentrated on the richest ten percent decedents that they contribute between 60 to 70 
percent of all bequests.  
We also separately investigate the patterns and time trends of seven principal 
bequeathable assets. Housing assets and the non-housing financial assets are the largest 
two categories that account for at least 60 percent of all bequests. On one hand, housing 
and real estates are dominant for households with bequeathable wealth holdings within 
the inter-quartile range and the importance of housing assets decreases rapidly with total 
wealth holdings. On the other hand, the share of the non-housing financial wealth 
increases with total wealth holdings that finally exceeds the share of housing assets for 
the top 5 percent decedents. All the other bequeathable assets take relatively small 
fractions of all bequests, expect trusts that the share increases dramatically within the top 
quartile of wealth and finally become the third largest bequeathable asset. 
To fully document the distributions of bequests, we also calculate the shares of 
bequests inherited by each type of recipients. The surviving spouses usually inherit 
almost all bequests. For single decedents, over three-quarters of all their bequests are 
inherited by their children. 
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5. IMPACTS OF BEQUESTS AND ESTATE TAXATION ON INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
One of the most important impacts of bequests on recipients is the distributional 
effect of bequests on household income of children. To be specific, we study income 
inequality of children and their households by estimating the Gini coefficients of 
children’s household income without and with inheritance, and before and after 
imposing the estate tax. As we have addressed that almost all bequests are inherited by 
the surviving spouses, we focus on single decedents with children. 
5.1 Annual returns of inheritances 
Because different types of assets have different rates of return, we calculate the 
annual income flow of inheritance according to the actual returns of various 
bequeathable assets.  
For the seven principle bequeathable assets, vehicles and life insurance benefits 
are usually inherited in lump sum instead of installments, and therefore we omit the 
annual income flow generated by these two asset categories. Since the housing and real 
estates are mostly residential, we use the residential rental yields to the calculate the 
annual income from housing and real estates. Moreover, since the rates of returns of 
different non-housing financial assets vary substantially, we break down financial assets 
to four categories, namely, stocks and funds, checking accounts and money markets, 
CDs, and bonds. Last but not least, although the rates of returns of different industries 
also vary significantly, we use the average rate of returns on equity to calculate the 
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returns of family business since HRS only contains the net value of family business 
without specifying the industries. 
Table 4 summarizes the means of the annual income generated by inheritances 
and the rates of returns of different bequeathable assets. 
 
 
 
Table 4 Mean annual income generated by inheritance components and the rates of returns 
Inherited assets Annual income of inheritance Annual rate of returns 
 Pre-tax mean 
Post-tax 
mean 
Annual 
mean Data source 
Housing and real estates 5419.97 4958.58 7% Residential rental yields 
Family business 909.85 783.16 12.3% Average rate of returns on equity 
Stocks and funds 6602.73 4909.04 10.8% S&P 500 
Checks and money markets 703.58 619.83 2.9% T-bills 
CDs 416.72 264.56 3% 1-year interest rate of CD 
Bonds 300.23 276.93 6.4% 10-year T bond 
Trusts 1060.56 937.01 5.3% Internal Revenue Code 7520 
Total inheritance income 15413.64 12849.11   
Total inheritance income 
received by children 10906.82 9483.73   
Note: The return rate of a trust is calculated by the Internal Revenue Code 7520 that is usually used to 
value certain charitable interests in trusts. 
 
 
 
On average, housing assets, stocks and funds yield the largest returns that 
account for over 75 percent of the total income generated by inheritances. Family 
business has the highest average rate of returns. More importantly, imposing estate taxes 
reduces the average annual income of inheritance by about 16.7 and 13 percent received 
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by all recipients and children recipients respectively. It is also worth to notice that the 
annual income generated by inheritable assets is highly concentrated that the 
recipients—mostly children—of the wealthiest 30 percent decedents finally acquire 
almost all inheritance income. Therefore, it is of great interest to study the impacts of the 
highly skewed income generated by inheritances on the household income of children. 
5.2 Imputation of household income of children 
Before we estimate the Gini coefficient of the household income of children, we 
impute the household income of children because HRS only provides the brackets of the 
household income since the survey wave four in 1998.  
Because HRS has continuous income data for the third wave of survey in 1996, 
we impute the amount of income in the subsequent survey waves by the average amount 
of the wave three income with respect to one the five income brackets—zero to ten 
thousand, ten to thirty-five thousand, thirty-five to seventy thousand, above thirty-five 
thousand, and above seventy thousand—of the wave for imputation. For example, if the 
income of a child is between thirty-five to seventy thousand dollars in wave six, 2002, 
we impute the amount by the average income between thirty-five and seventy thousand 
dollars of wave three. 
5.3 Impacts of bequests and estate tax on income of children households 
Table 5 summarizes the means and quantiles of the imputed household income of 
children without bequests, with pre-estate tax bequests, and with post-estate tax 
bequests, and the household income of the decedents—the parents. 
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Table 5 Household income of children and their parents 
 Mean Quantile 
  10 25 50 75 90 95 
Children household income, 
without bequests 79.25 5.27 36.68 75.54 108.05 167.47 175.88 
Children household income, 
with bequests, no tax 81.81 5.54 36.81 75.54 110.97 170.2 177.03 
Children household income, 
with bequests after tax 81.5 5.54 36.81 75.54 110.65 170.2 176.95 
Household income of parents 42.54 9.06 14.26 25.69 47.3 80.9 118.76 
 
 
 
On average, the household income of children is about 86 percent higher than the 
household income of the deceased parents. After receiving inheritances, the average 
annual income increases by about 3 percent, leading to about 92 percent higher annual 
income flow than their parents. On the other hand, imposing estate taxes reduces the 
average household income with the returns of inheritances of children by about 0.4 
percent. 
Then we estimate the Gini coefficients of household income of children to 
evaluate the impacts of inheritances and estate taxation on income inequality among 
children and their households. When estimating the Gini coefficients, we allow 
correlations of household income for children belong to the same family.  
As shown in Table 6, the inequality of household income of children is moderate. 
Receiving inheritances increases the income inequality very lightly that the Gini 
coefficient only increases by about two percent. Moreover, the effect of estate tax in 
reducing the income inequality of offspring is almost negligible that the Gini coefficient 
decreases by only 0.8 percent after imposing the estate tax.   
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Table 6 Gini coefficients of household income of children 
 Gini coefficients 
Without bequests 0.4071*** 
With bequests, before taxed 0.4160*** 
With bequests, after taxed 0.4126*** 
Note: All Gini coefficients are based the household income of children from the single-parent families. 
The asterisks indicate that all Gini coefficients are significant at the 1 percent confidence level. 
 
 
 
The reason of the very limited—almost negligible—effects of bequests and estate 
on the distribution of children’s household income is that the amounts of inheritances 
received by children and their households are too small on average, compared with the 
scale of the children’s household income before inheriting bequests. As implied by Table 
5, the annual income generated by inheritances only account for about 3 percent of all 
household income of children. 
5.4 Alternative explanations  
Before reaching the conclusions, we discuss two alternative explanations that 
may lead to the same results of the limited effects of bequests and estate tax. We find 
that the alternative hypotheses do not explain the almost indifferent Gini coefficients 
properly, leaving the small scale of inheritance income the sole reasonable explanation. 
5.4.1 Equal division 
The first alternative explanation is the equal division of bequests that over three-
quarters of the decedents distribution their bequests equally to their children. Therefore, 
if bequests are not distributed equally, we may observe larger effects of receiving 
inheritances and imposing estate taxes.  
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Table 7 Gini coefficients without equal division of bequests 
 Gini coefficients 
 Equal division Random assignment 
To the richest 
kids 
To the poorest 
kids 
With bequests, before taxed 0.4158*** 0.4171*** 0.4182*** 0.4139*** 
With bequests, after taxed 0.4124*** 0.4130*** 0.4135*** 0.4115*** 
 
 
 
We examine the Gini coefficients under four different methods of diving 
bequests, namely equal division among all children, giving all to only one child 
randomly, giving all to the richest child, and giving all to the poorest child. We find that 
although the Gini coefficients (Table 7) vary under different division methods of 
bequests, the differences are too small. Therefore, equal division cannot explain the 
limited effects of bequests and estate tax on the distributions of household income of 
children. 
5.4.2 Compensation for poorer children households 
The second alternative explanation is that children with less household income 
do not receive much less bequests in aggregate. As a result, bequests tend to reduce or at 
least do not significantly increase the income inequality of children households.  
Figure 6 shows the fractions of total inheritance income received by children and 
their households, conditional on the quartiles of the household income of children. It is 
clear that wealthier households also receive more inheritances that generating more 
annual income. Therefore, the second alternative explanation is also invalid. 
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Figure 6 Share of inheritance income received by children by income quartiles of children 
Note: Percentages in the bars are the shares of all inheritance income received. Marks on the left are the 
household income quartiles of children. 
 
 
 
5.5 Summary 
After documenting the distributions of bequests, we shift to study one of the most 
important topic of the impacts of bequests and estate tax—the effects of bequests and 
estate tax on the distribution of income of children and their households. By focusing on 
children of the single decedents, we find that bequests and estate tax have very limited—
even negligible—effects on income inequality of children. We conclude that the reason 
is the tiny scale of annual income generated by inheritances. This explanation is robust 
since we examine and rule out two alternative explanations—the equal division of 
bequests, and the compensation for poorer children in aggregate. 
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6. CHILDREN AND BEQUEST MOTIVES: EFFECTS OF PARENT-
CHILD INTERACTIONS AND EXCESSIVE FINANCIAL BURDENS 
 
In this section, we study a puzzling issue in the bequest motives literature that 
although it is natural to assume a positive relationship between having a child and 
having a bequest motive, most studies find little evidence on such a positive relationship. 
As a result, the causes of bequests are either accidental—a lack of motive—or egoistic—
a motive not related to any person except a decedent herself. 
We argue that the studies do not find a positive relationship because they fail to 
separate two factors, namely the belief in children’s future help and the excessive 
financial burdens, that have opposite effects for individuals with children on their 
bequest motives and the actual amount of bequests given. Without separately identify the 
two opposite effects, we cannot observe significant difference of bequests left between 
individuals with and without children. 
Moreover, we focus on single decedents that die without a surviving spouse or 
partner. The reasons are twofold. As we have documented in section four, almost all 
bequests are inherited by the surviving spouses if the decedents are from couple 
households. Therefore, the bequest motives of decedents with a surviving spouse are less 
likely to be significantly correlated with their children. Even if some decedents have 
strong bequest intentions for children, since almost all bequests are inherited by the 
surviving spouses, it is difficult to find clear empirical evidence of the relationship 
between having a child and having a bequest motive. Secondly, because most previous 
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studies focus on single households, the results would be more comparable with the 
literature if we focus on the same group of people. 
Last but not least, since bequest motives can be measured by the propensity of 
saving, we focus on the changes of bequeathable wealth within the last 6 to 8 years of 
life since most HRS respondents report that their financial planning horizons are 
between 5 and 10 years. The changes of bequeathable wealth is measured by the ratio of 
bequeathable wealth changes 𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 between the initial period 𝑠𝑠 and the last period 𝑇𝑇 with 
respect to the wealth of the initial period 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠, 𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 = (𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇 − 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠)/𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠. 
6.1 Interactions between parents and their children 
Because HRS tracks the interactive activities between individuals above 50 and 
their children, we are able to study the effect of each interactive activity on bequest 
motives and the actual bequests giving. To be specific, the interactive activities are in 
form of providing help to each other. From children to parents, HRS asks whether a 
child ever helped her parent with daily activities or financially. HRS also asks about the 
belief of parents that their children will help them in the future, despite the children have 
ever helped or not. From parents to children, HRS asks the history that the parents ever 
helped to take care of grandchildren. Moreover, HRS also keep records about the inter-
vivos transfers between parents and children. 
6.1.1 Number of children and the changes of bequeathable wealth 
Before we move on to study the parent-child interactions, we firstly illustrate the 
typical findings in literature that using the number of children to identify a bequest 
motive. Figure 7 shows the ratios of bequeathable wealth changes conditional on the 
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number of children. The figure indicates that on average, decedents without any child—
the bottom bars—actually dissave less than decedents have children. This pattern is 
robust for over three-quarters of single decedents whose bequeathable wealth holdings 
generally decrease or do not increase significantly when approaching the end of life.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Ratio of bequeathable wealth change by number of children 
Note: Figure lists the average ratio, and the ratios at the 25, 50, 75, and 90 percentiles. 
 
 
 
To see why only using the number of child do not identify a bequest motive, in 
additional to conditional on the number of children, we also conditional on a bequest 
motive related variable—the dummy of having a will witnessed or probated, or not. We 
firstly find that decedents with a will are significantly more reluctant to exploit their 
wealth during the last years of life. The average ratio of bequeathable wealth change for 
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decedents with a will is about -19 percent, significantly higher than the ratio of 
decedents without any will -34 percent.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Ratio of bequeathable wealth changes conditional on number of children and will dummy 
 
 
 
However, the difference of the ratio is much larger for decedents with children 
than for decedents without children. As Figure 8 shows, for decedents with children, the 
average ratios of having a will and not are -19.7 and -36 percent. For decedents without 
any child, the difference between the average ratios of having a will and not is much 
smaller, say -16.6 percent for having will versus -23.9 for not having a will. The 
descriptive evidence implies substantial heterogeneity of underlying bequest motives 
among single parents with children. 
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 6.2.2 Parent-child interactions and the changes of bequeathable wealth 
Among various interactive activities between parents and their children, we find 
that single parents who believe that their children would help them in all kinds of forms 
actually dissave less and are more likely to save during the last six to eight years of life. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Ratios of bequeathable wealth changes conditional on the belief and history of help 
Note: Ratios larger than 100 percent are excluded. Figure is drawn conditional on decedents having at 
least one child. 
 
 
 
Using the same method, Figure 9 displays the changes in bequeathable wealth, 
conditional on the history of help from children, and the parents’ beliefs of the future 
help from children. The figure clearly shows that the parents who are never helped by 
children during the last years of life dissave significantly less than parents under the 
alternative situations. On the contrary, parents who were helped but do not have a belief 
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of getting help from their children in the future have the highest tendency of using up 
their wealth. 
We confirm this descriptive evidence by the actual bequest distributions 
conditional on the different types of parent-child interactions. Table 8 lists the actual 
bequest distributions conditional on four types of parent-child interactions plus the case 
of zero child. In general, focusing on the actual bequests yields similar results as 
focusing on the end of life wealth trajectories.  
 
 
 
Table 8 Distribution of actual bequests conditional on types of interactions 
 mean p50 p75 p90 
Not helped, don’t believe in future help 173.7 5.4 114.3 605.2 
Not helped, believe in future help 221.2 28.2 237.1 600.0 
Helped, don’t believe in future help 104.2 3.2 74.9 340.1 
Helped, believe in future help 125.0 9.1 110.7 393.7 
No kid 183.8 5.3 113.5 569.4 
Note: The amounts of bequests are displayed as every 1,000 2012 dollars.  
 
 
 
To be specific, the decedents that are never helped but believe in future help not 
only tend to dissave less, but also actually leave more bequests on average. Except the 
top 10 percent bequests givers, this group of decedents also leave significantly more 
bequests than any other group. Moreover, the decedents that are helped but no longer 
believe that their children will help in the future have the lowest ratio of bequeathable 
wealth change and they also turn out to leave the least amount of bequests on average. 
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Last but not least, a surprising finding is that the decedents with children but never 
receive help from them and neither believe in help in the future have similar average 
wealth trajectory and actual bequest distribution as the decedents without any child.  
6.2 Excessive financial burdens 
Although we have documented the different end of life wealth trajectories and 
the actual bequest distributions of decedents with different types of parent-child 
interactions. The reason that why the bequeathable wealth of a particular group of 
decedents depletes faster that lead to significantly lower actual amounts of bequest is 
still unclear. 
To address this issue, we investigate that whether some single parents with 
children have excessive financial burdens compared with other single parents with and 
without children. In particular, we use the out-of-pocket medical spending to household 
income ratio to measure the financial burdens due to the high demand of medical 
services during the last years of life. 
Table 9 shows the distributions of the out-of-pocket medical spending to 
household income ratios conditional on having a child or not, and on four types of 
parent-child interactions. On average, decedents with children have similar level of 
financial burdens as decedents without any child. However, when we investigate the 
financial burdens through the different types of parent-child interactions, we find 
significant variations. Consistent with the previous findings, decedents that are not 
helped and believe in future help have the lightest burdens, while decedents that are 
helped but do not believe in future help have the largest burdens, more than three times 
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higher on average than decedents of the first interaction type. Moreover, we also 
investigate the trajectories of financial burdens and find that the patterns are consistent 
over time.  
  
 
 
Table 9 Out-of-pocket medical spending to income ratio 
 Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Kid dummy       
No kid 25.15 0.44 3.73 9.99 29.65 71.05 
With kid 28.43 1.23 4.55 13.86 36.52 81.58 
Interactions       
Not helped, with belief 16.53 0.73 2.88 8.32 20.54 37.67 
Not helped, no belief 25.04 0.97 4.41 10.42 27.26 74.41 
Helped, with belief 29.58 1.62 5.42 16.15 40.87 74.85 
Helped, no belief 40.70 1.91 7.01 22.62 61.49 111.22 
Note: All values are percentages.   
 
 
 
6.3 Empirical models and results of estimations 
To estimate the effects of the different types of the parent-child interactions, and 
the effect of the excessive financial burdens on the, we estimate a linear model for log 
actual bequests on kid dummy, dummies of helped before and belief of future help, the 
out-of-pocket medical spending ratio, and other covariates including the log initial 
wealth, net transfers between parents and children during the last years, conventional 
demographics and dummies indicating the year of death. 
Table 10 summarize the covariates of interest that on average 87 percent of the 
single decedents died between 1996 and 2012 have one or more children in contact. 
 35 
 
Over half of the decedents have ever got help from their children between 1996 and 
2012. Also, over half of the decedents believe that their children will help them in the 
future, despite the history of whether helped by children. On average, decedents use 
nearly thirty percent of their household income to pay out-of-pocket medical bills 
 
 
 
Table 10 Means of selected covariates of interest 
Variable Mean 
Have kids 0.87 
Helped by children  0.51 
Believe in future help form children 0.55 
Out-of-pocket medication spending to income ratio 0.28 
Have kids × Out-of-pocket medication spending to income ratio 0.25 
Kid helped × Out-of-pocket medication spending to income ratio 0.18 
Kid help in future × Out-of-pocket medication spending to income ratio 0.13 
Log initial bequests 10.7 
Note: The first three variables are dummies and the rest variables are continuous. The sample contains 
1875 individuals above age 50 that died between 1996 and 2012. 
 
 
 
The results of estimations are in Table 10. The coefficients of the baseline model 
show evidence of both the effects of parent-child interactions and the excessive financial 
burdens.  
On average, decedents will leave 30 percent more bequests if they believe that 
their children will be helpful one day in future, despite the history of ever helped by 
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children. On the other hand, if decedents are ever helped by their children, they will 
leave bequests less by over 50 percent.  
 
 
 
Table 11 Estimations of the effects of parent-child interaction and excessive financial burdens 
 Only 
kids 
Kids and 
interactions 
Kids and 
burdens 
Baseline 
model 
With kids -.468** -.323 -.642*** -.538** 
Helped by kids  -.479***  -.578*** 
Belief in future help from kids  .451***  .322* 
Out-of-pocket medical spending to 
household income ratio   -.757*** -1.097*** 
Out-of-pocket medical spending to 
household income ratio × helped    .671 
Out-of-pocket medical spending to 
household income ratio × believe in 
future help 
   -.192 
Log initial wealth .999*** .985*** .991*** .977*** 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.535 0.539 0.542 0.546 
Note: All estimations exclude out-of-pocket medical spending to income ratio and wealth change ratio 
larger than 2. *, **, and *** represents the 10, 5, and 1 percent confidence level. 
 
 
 
Moreover, the excessive financial burdens significantly reduce the amounts of 
actual bequests that a 10 percent increase in the out-of-pocket medical spending ratio 
will lead to an 11 percent decrease in actual bequests. As a result, the effect of the 
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excessive financial burdens overweighs the positive effect of the belief in children’s 
future help. 
Last but not least, the coefficients of the log initial bequeathable wealth are 
always significant and the levels are stable with respect to different model specifications. 
This implies that the bequeathable wealth holdings are very stable during the last years 
of life. 
6.4 Reconciliation with the causes of bequests in literature 
The findings of this section firstly explains the puzzle that many studies find little 
evidence between having a child and having a bequest motive. We find that on average, 
household with children even leave less bequests. However, for a particular group of the 
deceased parents, namely the ones that believe their children will help them in the future 
finally leave significantly more bequests. Therefore, the conclusion that most bequests 
are accidental due to the high uncertainty of the time of death during the late years omits 
the substantial heterogeneity in bequest motives for individuals with children.  
Instead of accidental bequests, some studies conclude that bequests are primarily 
due to the egoistic motive—or the warm-glow motive in some literature—and therefore 
the amount of bequests is very weakly related to children. On one hand, we find 
evidence to support this conclusion since the coefficient of log initial wealth implies that 
the average wealth holdings are very stable and the wealthier individuals will finally 
leave more bequests. On the other hand, the findings in this paper suggests that the 
possibilities of a strategic or an altruistic motive are not slim. Since over half decedents 
have a belief that their children will help them in the future, and the coefficient of the 
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belief dummy is also significant, it is reasonable to infer that a nontrivial fraction of 
decedents may also have a strategic or an altruistic motive for bequests. 
However, our findings so far cannot identify whether the belief of children’s help 
in the future is due to a strategic motive that parents try exchange long term care from 
children with bequests, or an altruistic motive that parents simply care about the 
wellbeing of their children after they pass away. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
By documenting the macro-patterns and time trends of the distributions of 
bequests left by Americans at age 50 and above between 1996 and 2012, this dissertation 
firstly finds that the aggregate scale of bequests is large and tracks development of the 
economy. Although the fraction of decedents that leave a positive amount of bequests 
decreased by over 10 percent during the 16 years, the fraction of decedents that leave 
moderate to substantial bequests slightly increased. This dissertation also finds that 
among all categories of bequests, housing and real estates, and non-housing financial 
assets are dominant that they account for at least 60 percent of all bequests. Moreover, 
the importance of housing assets while the fraction of financial assets increases with 
total bequeathable wealth holdings. Last but not least, bequests are highly concentrated 
on the rich decedents that the richest 10 percent decedents contribute over 60 percent of 
all bequests. 
After documenting the patterns and times trends of bequest distributions, this 
dissertation shifts to study the impacts of bequests and estate taxation on annual income 
generated by the returns of inheritable assets, and the effects on the income distribution 
of the children of the decedents. This dissertation calculates the income from 
inheritances by the actual rates of returns of different assets. On the contrary to some 
findings in literature, this paper finds that bequests and estate tax on average have every 
limited effects—no larger than 3 percent—on the income of children. This dissertation 
indicates that the limited effects are due to the small scale of annual income of 
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inheritances. Compared with the scale of income of children households, the annual 
income from inheritances accounts for only about 3 percent of total household income of 
children. To get conclusive results, this dissertation test two alternative explanations that 
may also lead to the limited effects, and the tests rule out the alternatives. 
The third topic studied in this dissertation is a puzzle in the bequest motives 
literature that many studies find counterintuitive results about little relationship between 
having a child and having a bequest motive. Through investigating the interactive 
activities between parents and children, as well as the financial burdens of the decedents, 
this dissertation finds that it is the opposite effects of the parents’ belief of children’s 
future help and the excessive financial burden of some parents eventually lead to 
negative findings on the relationship between having a child and having a bequest 
motive. Moreover, this dissertation estimates that effects of the positive belief and the 
excessive financial burden and the reconciles the findings in this dissertation with 
different evidence and conclusions in literature. To be specific, the conclusion of 
accidental bequests in literature is due to neglecting the heterogeneity of bequest 
preferences of parents, and the conclusion of dominant egoistic bequest motive 
overestimates the wealth effects and also neglects the different opposite preferences on 
bequests among individual with children. 
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